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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
T -i. « 4.* * #2A-2/10/84 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NO. U-7183 
PHILIP GOLDRICH. 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS. 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NO. U-7159 
) PHILIP GOLDRICH. 
Charging Party. 
PHILIP GOLDRICH. pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On December 9. 1983, the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissed a charge 
filed by Philip Goldrich against the Board of Education of the 
City School District of the City of New York (District) which 
alleges that the District had violated various provisions of 
its collective bargaining agreement with the United Federation 
of Teachers (UFT). According to Goldrich. the contract 
violations first occurred in December 1981 and January 1982. 
when the Adult Basic Education/High School Equivalency Services 
?! 
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Unit of the District (Unit) relieved him of two assignments and 
gave him two other assignments he did not want. Goldrich 
further alleges that the collective bargaining agreement was 
again violated in September and October 1983 when he was not 
appointed to fill a vacancy in one of the positions from which 
he had been relieved a year and a half earlier. Among the 
alleged contract violations was the Unit's insistence that 
Goldrich be licensed to perform the assignments he sought as a 
condition for being given such assignments. 
The Director dismissed this charge on the ground that it 
merely alleged contract violations, and that §205.5(d) of the 
Taylor Law declares that "the Board shall not have authority to 
enforce an agreement between an employer and an employee 
organization . . . ." 
On December 13. 1983. the Director dismissed a second 
charge filed by Goldrich relating to the same circumstances. 
This charge alleges that UFT did not support his objection to 
the District's actions. The Director read the charge as 
focusing on the conduct of the Unit in December 1981 and 
January 1982 and he dismissed it on the ground that it was not 
timely.— He also determined that the charge did not 
i'7Goldrich had been given an'opportunity to expand and 
clarify his charge. In doing so he merely alleged that UFT had 
violated §209-a.2(b). as well as §209-a.2(a). in that its conduct 
denied him his right to negotiate. The Director correctly 
determined that this allegation did not set forth a violation of 
the Taylor Law as that law does not afford individuals any right 
to negotiate. State of New York. 13 PERB ir3063 (1980). 
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set forth a violation of the duty of fair representation as 
interpreted by this Board in City School District of the City 
of New York, 15 PERB ir3074 (1982). in that it did not allege 
facts showing that UFT"s refusal to support Goldrich was 
improperly motivated or that it was the result of gross 
negligence or irresponsible conduct. 
As explained by Goldrich's exceptions, we now understand 
his charge to complain that UFT refused to support him in 
September and October 1983 when he sought reassignment to one 
of the positions from which he had previously been removed. 
Accordingly, the charge is not untimely. However, we affirm 
the decision of the Director dismissing the charge on the 
Director's alternative grounds. The charge does not allege 
facts indicating that UFT was improperly motivated or that its 
refusal to support Goldrich for reassignment was a result of 
gross negligence or irresponsible conduct. On the contrary, 
Goldrich informs us in his exceptions that the relevant 
language of the collective bargaining agreement is ambiguous 
and that the UFT representative interpreted it as giving the 
District the right to act as it did. We have recently held 
that a union need not endorse the grievance of a unit employee 
when its interpretation of its collective bargaining agreement 
does not support the employee's position. Nanuet (Berqerman), 
17 PERB 1P005 (1984) . 
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NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charges herein be. and 
they hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: February 10. 1984 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
XL &U. '*****£-
Ida Klaus. Member 
^=T_, 
David C. Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//2B-2/10/84 
In the Matter of 
DUTCHESS COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6 602 
FRANCINE ROSEN, 
Charging Party. 
RUDOLPH P. RUSSO. ESQ.. for the Respondent 
RICHARD B. WOLF. ESQ.. for the Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to the Board on the exceptions of the 
charging party, Francine Rosen (Rosen), to the hearing 
officer's decision dismissing her improper practice charge 
against Dutchess Community College (College) on the ground that 
the College is not a public employer within the meaning of 
§201.6(a)(iii) of the Act insofar as her employment at the 
College's so-called "IBM French School" is concerned. Because 
he dismissed the charge on jurisdictional grounds, the hearing 
officer did not reach the merits of the charge, although the 
matter was fully litigated at a hearing. Thus, the sole issue 
presented to the Board by the exceptions and the College's 
response is whether the College is a public employer (and Rosen 
is a public employee) under the particular circumstances set 
forth in the record. 
Board - U-6602 -2 
FACTS 
Rosen is employed by the College to teach French to degree 
candidates as a part-time adjunct lecturer. She is also 
employed by the College to teach French on a part-time basis at 
the "IBM French School". The charge alleges that the College 
reduced Rosen's course load and salary as an adjunct lecturer at 
the College's main campus in an attempt to interfere with her 
and others' organizational rights as employees at the College's 
"IBM French School". 
Since 1980. the College has entered into a series of 
virtually identical yearly contracts with International Business 
Machines Corporation (IBM) to provide what the contract refers 
to as "an educational program for IBM France employees' 
children". Under the contract, the College undertakes to 
"conduct a program of courses" and to provide fully-eguipped 
classrooms, instructors, and normal classroom materials. The 
contract provides that all personnel used by the College for 
this program will be employees of the College, and the College 
will be "solely responsible for their supervision, daily 
direction and control, payment of salary (including withholding 
of income taxes and Social Security), Worker's Compensation, 
disability benefits and the like". Under the contract, only IBM 
can decide who the student participants will be. IBM pays a fee 
to the College which is intended to reimburse the College for 
the full cost of the program, including personnel, eguipment. 
building lease, maintenance, utility and administrative costs. 
r 8 7 
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The program provides pre-college (both primary and 
secondary) level education to the children of French nationals 
employed by IBM France working in the United States, and 
enrollment is limited to such children. Curricula for each 
grade are designed by IBM and the French Ministry of Education. 
Individual subjects are taught from a syllabus prepared by the 
French Ministry of Education. Classes are held at the College's 
Martha Lawrence Extension site in a building leased by the 
College from a local school district. Other extension programs 
of the College are also conducted at this site. The charging 
party has been an instructor in this program since 1980 pursuant 
to yearly employment contracts with the College and has been 
paid for her services by the College. The College provides and 
has provided special programs for employees of private companies 
pursuant to contract. 
HEARING OFFICER DECISION 
Noting that a "public employer" includes "...a school 
district or any governmental entity operating a public school, 
college or university..." (CSL §201.6[a][iii]), the hearing 
officer found that the College was not "operating a public 
school, college or university" at the IBM French School. He 
concluded that the College was acting as "a provider of 
exclusively private educational services" under contract with a 
private entity. He relied on the fact that enrollment was 
limited to children of IBM France employees, and curricula and 
syllabi were prescribed by the French Ministry of Education and 
789 
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on testimony to the effect that neither the State Education 
Department nor any other agency of the State exercised 
jurisdiction over this operation. 
DISCUSSION 
For the reasons hereinafter stated, we reverse the hearing 
officer's decision. 
It is undisputed that Dutchess Community College is a 
"community college" as defined in §6301 of the Education Law and 
was established and is operated pursuant to the provisions of 
Article 126 of the Education Law.- As such, it is primarily 
funded by the State of New York, Dutchess County, and student 
tuition (Ed. Law §6304). There is no dispute that, as such, the 
College is a "public employer" within the meaning of the Act. 
There is also no dispute that the College conducts the subject 
operation; it is performed under its supervision, with its 
employees, in its building. The employment relationship that 
this Board is concerned with is exclusively between the College 
and the persons employed by it. Nevertheless, the 
1/A community college is established pursuant to the 
provisions of Article 126 of the Education Law to provide 
"two-year post secondary programs pursuant to regulations 
prescribed by the state university trustees and receiving 
financial assistance from the state therefor" (Ed. Law §6301.2), 
Community colleges so established "shall provide two-year programs 
of post high school nature combining general education with 
technical education relating to the occupational needs of the 
community or area in which the college is located and those of the 
state and the nation generally. Special courses and extension 
work may be provided for part-time students." (Ed Law §6303.1) 
- 8790 
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hearing officer analyzed the jurisdictional question by examining 
solely the nature of the program conducted by the College at the 
"IBM French School". He concluded that this operation is 
"private" and since the Act's definition refers to the operation 
of a "public" school, the College cannot be considered a public 
employer with regard to this particular operation. 
We do not accept the hearing officer's analysis. He has 
apparently found it necessary to apply the statutory definition 
to every separate function of an entity which is admittedly a 
public employer. We do not so construe the statute. There being 
no dispute that the College, as an institution, is a "public 
employer" within the meaning of the Taylor Law and that the 
charging party is a "person holding a position by appointment or 
employment in the service of" the College (CSL §201.7[a]). it is 
not material—for the purpose of determining this Board's 
jurisdiction—whether the IBM program conducted by the College is 
regarded as "public" or "private". A public employer is no less 
a public employer because it may provide a "private" service. 
Once it is determined that the entity meets the definition of 
"public employer", jurisdiction is established as to all 
functions it performs. (See State of New York (Insurance 
Department Liquidation Bureau), 17 PERB ir3003) The decision of 
the Court of Appeals in New York Public Library v. PERB. 37 NY2d 
752. 8 PERB V7013 (1975). does not require a different result. 
That decision dealt with the issue of whether the institution as 
an entity was a public employer; the test articulated in that 
case relates to 
'*• 8791 
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the status of the entity. That test need not be applied to every 
separate function an entity, which is admittedly a public 
employer, may perform at any given time. 
Furthermore, we do not agree that the operation in question 
is an "exclusively private educational service", as found by the 
hearing officer. The Education Law authorizes the College to 
provide "special courses and extension work". (Education Law 
§6303.1) We think it is more consistent with applicable statutes 
to characterize this operation as simply an example of this 
public function. Furthermore, to the extent that it might be 
inferred from the hearing officer's decision that the College in 
this respect is operating a private "school", we find no basis in 
this record - other than the use of the term by the parties - to 
find it to be a "school" within the meaning of CSL §201.6(a)(iii) 
of the Act. The parties themselves have not purported to create 
a "school". What the College provides pursuant to its contract 
with IBM is simply and precisely what they describe in their 
contract, i.e. an educational program, not unlike other special 
educational programs it has provided pursuant to contracts with 
other private companies. In our view, for the purposes of the 
Taylor Law. such educational programs are no more than an aspect 
of the extension services the College is authorized by statute to 
provide. 
Since this operation is an educational program offered by 
the College, we find it to be a service provided by a 
"governmental entity operating a public...college...." As the 
7^32 
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College is a public employer when it provides this program, the 
persons employed by the College in this program are public 
employees. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that this proceeding be remanded to 
the hearing officer to issue a decision and 
recommended order on the merits of the 
charge. 
DATED: February 10. 1984 
Albany, New York 
J&^&Z^/^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
-ad-
Ida Klaus. Member 
David C. Randies), Member 
5»T 179? <LP
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
#2C-2/10/84 
SOUTH HUNTINGTON UNITED AIDES. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6716 
AUDREY S. DEERFIELD. 
Charging Party. 
DOLORES SCHIRMER. for Respondent 
JOSEPH BULGATZ. ESQ.. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
In the charge herein. Audrey S. Deerfield alleges that the 
South Huntington United Aides (Union) violated its duty of fair 
representation by refusing to demand that the South Huntington 
School District (District) reopen negotiations for the purpose 
of considering a proposal that it provide her with a stipend 
for screening new children for a comprehensive kindergarten 
program. The hearing officer determined that the Union's 
refusal to make such a demand did not constitute a violation of 
its duty of fair representation, and the matter now comes to us 
on Deerfield's exceptions. 
The Union first organized the teacher aides in 1979. 
Deerfield had then been a teacher aide for 16 years; she had 
been screening kindergarten applicants for nine years and had 
received a stipend for this work. She did not inform the Union 
that she was receiving a stipend and it was not considered 
8794 
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during the ensuing negotiations.— These negotiations 
produced an agreement which allocated no stipend for 
Deerfield's "screening" assignment and contained a "zipper 
clause" which, according to the District, precludes such a 
stipend.— 
Deerfield then complained to Schirmer, a field 
representative for the New York State United Teachers, and the 
person who negotiated the agreement on behalf of the Union. 
Schirmer assured Deerfield that the Union would not stand on 
the contract language for the purpose of preventing her receipt 
of the stipend. Moreover. Schirmer tried to persuade the 
District to restore the stipend, but she was not successful. 
) 
i^As noted by Deerfield: 
[T]he District's then Director of the Comprehensive 
Kindergarten Program advised Deerfield not to 
disclose the subject of the Screening Pay to the 
Union and represented that she would be protected 
if she did so. 
Acting in reliance on this advice and 
representation. Deerfield never mentioned the 
Screening Pay to the Union, and. as a result, no 
demand concerning that subject was made by the 
Union in bargaining, and the agreement produced by 
the parties did not deal with it. 
£/The zipper clause provides: 
This Agreement contains the entire agreement 
between the parties. 
No past practice, rule, policy or regulation 
shall be deemed to be a part of this Agreement 
) unless specifically incorporated herein. 
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Upon the advice of her attorney. Deerfield told Schirmer 
that, the zipper clause notwithstanding, the Union could demand 
negotiations on matters not covered in the agreement, and her 
stipend was such a matter. She then asked the Union to make 
such a demand. 
Schirmer refused to do so and gave two reasons for her 
position. The first was that the Union had no obligation to 
Deerfield to make such a demand in that she had not called the 
problem to its attention at the appropriate time, which is when 
it was originally formulating its negotiation posture. The 
second was that the Union would be violating a responsibility to 
the District if it did so because it had entered into an 
agreement with the District in "good faith" and a subsequent 
demand for a stipend for Deerfield would constitute "bad faith". 
In her exceptions Deerfield concedes that the Union could, 
in the exercise of its discretion, have refused to demand 
payment of her stipend, but she asserts that the Union did not 
do so. Instead, according to Deerfield, the Union's refusal to 
make that demand was based upon an erroneous interpretation of 
the collective bargaining agreement as precluding such 
negotiations as evidenced by its reliance upon the legal 
concepts: "good faith" and "bad faith". This error of law was, 
according to Deerfield, occasioned by the "gross negligence" of 
the Union's failure to consult its attorneys. Thus. Deerfield 
contends, the Union's refusal to make the demand constitutes a 
violation of the duty of fair representation. 
Board - U-6716 
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We reject this argument. Deerfield's attempt to interpret 
the Union's position as being based upon legal rather than 
policy considerations is not persuasive. The Union's first 
justification for not seeking to reopen negotiations on 
Deerfield's behalf was that she was not deserving of such 
unusual consideration because she had not informed it of her 
stipend in advance of the original negotiations. Furthermore, 
Schirmer's use of the terminology "good faith" and "bad faith" 
does not mean that she believed that the Union could not make 
the demand; it is equally consistent with the view that she 
believed that it would not be in keeping with the spirit of the 
prior negotiations for the Union to do so. 
In any event, we would dismiss the charge even if 
Schirmer's statement were interpreted as bowing to legal 
compulsion. Whether or not the zipper clause precluded 
negotiations on a demand for Deerfield's stipend would depend 
upon the parties' intent in negotiating that clause. Under such 
circumstances, it would not be gross negligence for Schirmer, 
the person who negotiated the agreement, to rely upon her own 
understanding of the parties' intent rather than to consult an 
3/ 
attorney for an opinion as to what the clause might mean.— 
1/See Nanuet (Berqerman), 17 FERB *f3005 (1984). in 
which we found that a union did not commit an improper 
practice when it relied upon its negotiator's 
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement to the 
detriment of a unit employee, even though similar language 
in a collective bargaining agreement involving other 
parties had been interpreted differently by an arbitrator. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: February 10. 1984 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
<*^ *- Idbusoc^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Memb 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #2D-2/l0/84 
NEWFIELD CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6592 
NEWFIELD TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
LOCAL 2810. NYSUT. AFT. AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party. 
BOND. SCHOENECK & KING, ESQS. (R. DANIEL BORDONI. ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
MARILYN NORDINE. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Newfield Teachers Association, Local 2810, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO (Association) to a decision of the hearing officer 
which dismissed its charge in its entirety. The charge 
alleged that the Newfield Central School District 
(District) had violated §209-a.l(a). (b). (c) and (d) of 
the Act when it unilaterally changed its rate of premium 
contribution for retirees' health insurance and 
-,• 8799 
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} 
subsequently failed to negotiate in good faith. No hearing 
was held, and no stipulation of facts was entered into. 
The hearing officer rendered his decision on the basis of 
undisputed material facts contained in the pleadings and 
subsequent correspondence. 
Those undisputed facts can be summarized as follows. 
On September 14. 1982. the Superintendent of the 
District notified the President of the Association that the 
Board of Education had adopted: 
. . .the following policy governing health 
insurance for retirees: 
(a) The health insurance premium paid by the 
District for retirees will be frozen at 
) the rate the Board is paying at the time 
of the employee's retirement. For those 
already retired, the maximum rate of 
contribution will be the rate paid as of 
September 1, 1982. 
On September 17. 1982. the President of the 
Association wrote to the Superintendent, stating in part: 
This change is contrary to the negotiated 
Agreement and to the practice of many years 
standing under the Agreement. 
He demanded that the District commence negotiations upon 
this issue. On September 29, 1982. the Superintendent 
wrote back stating that since the Association does not 
represent retirees, the District will not negotiate 
regarding them. The letter states, however: 
; 
- 6800 
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The Board of Education will discuss with you 
or your representatives the effect of such a 
policy on current employees. It is their 
understanding that policy as it affects 
current employees is one which could be 
negotiated. 
In a letter dated October 26, 1982 to the representative 
of the Association, the Superintendent stated, in part: 
The Board of Education did state that they 
are willing to negotiate the effect of their 
policy on current employees. 
Thereafter, representatives of the District and the 
Association met on January 4. 1983, during which meeting 
the District's negotiator made certain statements which 
prompted the Association to claim that the District was 
negotiating in bad faith. The District, in its answer, 
denied that its agent refused to negotiate in good faith. 
At all relevant times, the parties were under a 
contract covering the period from July 1. 1981 to June 30, 
1983. The health insurance clause of that contract 
(Article XIV) provides that the Board of Education will 
participate in the New York State Health Insurance Program 
or its equivalent and provide "100% coverage of both the 
family plan and the individual plan." The contract also 
contains the following: "Both parties agree that no 
negotiable items which have been discussed in reaching the 
most current agreement will be reopened during the 
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duration of that agreement except by mutual consent." 
In his decision, the hearing officer determined: 
1. That as to retirees who might be affected by 
the District's change of policy, there was no 
obligation to negotiate witti the Association: 
2. That as to current employees who might be 
affected by the change of policy, the issue 
was exclusively one of contract violation, a 
dispute which is not subject to the 
jurisdiction of this Board; and 
3. That there was no need to consider whether 
events at the one meeting satisfied the 
statutory standard to negotiate in good 
faith, since the subject dealt with was 
covered by the contract, and there could be 
no finding that the parties' contract 
contained an indisputably clear reopener 
clause. In so holding, the hearing officer 
relied upon Levittown UFSD, 13 PERB ir3014 
(1980) and State of New York, 13 PERB 1F3106 
(1980). 
In its exceptions, the Association primarily complains 
that the Association was not given an opportunity to 
present facts in support of its allegations. The 
Association asserts, in particular, that it was not given 
an opportunity to present facts that would show: that the 
Board - U-6592 
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District negotiated in bad faith with regard to current 
employees; that a unit member retired during the contract 
term; whether or not there was indeed a breach of the 
contract; and whether or not there was a reopener agreed to 
by the parties. In its exceptions, the Association also 
charges the hearing officer with "extreme prejudice" toward 
it and with accepting "facts" from the respondent without 
giving it the opportunity to refute them. 
As to the allegations of extreme prejudice by the 
hearing officer, the Association was asked to submit an 
affidavit in support of such claim. An affidavit was 
submitted. We conclude, however, that it describes only 
the fact-finding method of the hearing officer, which does 
not evidence any prejudice on his part. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the hearing officer's dismissal of the 
charging party's conclusory allegation that the District 
violated §209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) of the Act. No facts 
appear in the charge or this record to support this claim. 
With regard to the alleged violation of §209-a.l(d). 
however, we conclude that the matter should be remanded to 
afford the Association and the District an opportunity to 
present more fully their respective positions. We do so 
because we determine that, in the absence of a hearing 
^ 
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record or stipulated facts, this charge cannot properly be 
dismissed on the basis of the undisputed facts presently 
before us. 
In our view, this case deals with the obligation of 
theDistrict to continue or to negotiate the level of 
payment of health insurance premiums with respect to 
current employees who might retire during the term of the 
contract covering the period July 1, 1981 to June 30, 
1983.— Such a benefit is a mandatory subject of 
2/ 
negotiation.— Whether or not any person actually 
retired within that time frame is not controlling as to the 
District's obligation to negotiate. The question before us 
is not one of impact negotiations, but the obligation to 
negotiate the subject itself. 
A/To the extent that the District's change of policy 
affected former employees who retired prior to the 
inception of the contract, there could not be a violation 
of §209-a.l(d) and the charge, to the extent that it 
relates to such persons, was properly dismissed by the 
hearing officer. (Trov UFFA. Local 2304, 10 PERB ir3015 
(1977); City of Oneida PBA. 15 PERB 1P096 (1982)). 
i/Lynbrook PBA. 10 PERB 1P067 (1977). rev'd in part. 
Incorporated Village of Lynbrook v. PERB, 64 AD2d 902. 11 
PERB T7012 (1978), reinstated 48 NY2d 398. 12 PERB if702i 
(1979) . 
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It would appear that the District unilaterally adopted 
a change of policy which affected current employees, and 
that the Association demanded negotiations with respect to 
such employees. It is not clear whether the District 
agreed to such negotiations, but it is clear that the 
District agreed to meet with the Association. The charge 
alleges that the District did not negotiate in good faith 
at such meeting. 
Two significant questions are raised by the facts as -
we presently know them, both of which were dealt with by 
the hearing officer in his decision. He recognized that if 
the subject in controversy was covered by the parties' 
contract, the action of the District might be no more than 
a breach of the contract and the Association's charge no 
more than an effort to obtain this Board's enforcement of 
the contract, a remedy which we cannot grant. He found 
that the subject was covered by the parties' contract and 
that the charge sought only the enforcement of that 
contract. He also recognized that, if the subject in 
controversy was covered by the contract, any allegation of 
bad faith negotiations occurring during the life of the 
contract with respect to that subject would not be 
entertained by this Board unless the parties have clearly 
agreed to further negotiations of the subject. Believing 
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that our past decisions hold that such agreement to further 
negotiations could only be evidenced by an indisputable 
"reopener" clause in the parties' contract, and finding no 
such clause in this contract, he held that we had no power to 
consider allegations of "bad faith" negotiations arising from 
the meeting between the parties. 
We disagree with the hearing officer's disposition of 
these issues. 
On the basis of the facts presently before us, we cannot 
hold that the parties' contract covers the subject of the 
dispute. While health insurance is dealt with in the 
contract, there is nothing specifically included concerning 
the right, if any, to continued payments of premiums after 
retirement on behalf of current employees who may retire 
during the life of the contract. This benefit can be of some 
significance and ought not to be inferred where there is no 
language in the contract specifically referring to it. In 
our view, it is also significant that neither party, in the 
charge or in the answer, appears to rely upon the contract to 
support its position.— 
1/we do not consider significant at this point the 
Association's reference to the contract in one of its 
letters to the District. 
88 
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It should be understood, however, that the parties in 
this proceeding may present further evidence relating to the 
negotiating history of this contract which may reveal an 
understanding not apparent on the face of the contract or a 
conscious waiver by the Association of its continuing right 
to negotiate on the subject of coverage after retirement. We 
do not believe it is appropriate at this time to leave the 
charging party with an "arguable" or "potential" breach of 
contract action when there is nothing presently before us 
which suggests any basis for such action. 
It is also necessary to comment on the hearing officer's 
disposition of the other issue presented by these facts. 
Even assuming that the parties' contract covers the subject 
of insurance benefits after retirement for current employees, 
we cannot accept the hearing officer's decision with regard 
to that aspect of the charge alleging bad faith negotiations 
at the meeting in January. We have previously held that 
where a charging party relies on contract language to support 
its right to good faith negotiations during the life of a 
contract with respect to a subject covered by that contract, 
we will only entertain such charge if the parties have agreed 
to an indisputable reopener clause in their contract (State 
of New York, 13 PERB f^3106 (i960)). While we have declined, 
therefore, to interpret the meaning of disputed contract 
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language for this purpose, we have recently held that where 
there is no dispute between the parties that they have agreed 
upon a relevant reopener. we shall entertain the improper 
practice charge (Hunter-Tannersvilie. 16 PERB 1f3l09 (1983)). 
In these decisions, we dealt only with claims based OIL 
contract language. We did not hold that the parties could 
only evidence their agreement to negotiate on a covered 
subject by clear language in their contract. Notwithstanding 
their contract, the parties are always free to mutually agree 
at any time during the life of their contract to negotiate 
further over a covered subject. Thus, the hearing officer; -
was in error in relying solely on the language of the 
contract when the charge herein alleges that the District 
agreed to the Association's demand to negotiate regarding the 
effect of its action on current employees. While we agree 
with his view that nothing in the contract indicates an 
agreement to reopen, the conduct of the parties after the 
District's policy announcement might warrant a different 
conclusion as to the Association's right to good faith 
negotiations. Thus, even if it were ultimately determined 
that the subject in controversy was indeed covered by the 
contract, it may be that the District did agree to negotiate 
on the subject. What took place at the meeting would then be 
relevant to a proper decision. 
. n. 
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ACCORDINGLY. WE ORDER that this matter be remanded for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this decision. 
DATED: February 10. 1984 
Albany.New York 
Y^/r^**^^-Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
%U^ J^liSLo^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ODESSA-MONTOUR CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and-
ODESSA-MONTOUR TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
RONALD C. HOUGHTALING. for Respondent, 
JOHN B. SCHAMEL. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to the Board on the exceptions of the 
Odessa-Montour Teachers' Association (Association) to the 
decision of the hearing officer dismissing its charge against 
the Odessa-Montour Central School District (District) 
alleging a violation of §209-a.l(a), (c) and (d) of the Act. 
In essence, the Association claims that in retaliation 
for its introduction into evidence at an arbitration hearing 
of certain unfavorable original evaluations of Association 
President Burris. which had been subsequently revised in his 
favor, the District caused to be placed in Burris' personnel 
file an original unfavorable 1980 evaluation. The 
Association claims that this "alteration" of the personnel 
file was intended to "punish" Burris because of activities 
protected by the Act. 
//2E-2/10/84 
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FACTS 
Burris was evaluated in June 1980. The Superintendent 
sustained his grievance as to the evaluation and directed a 
reevaluation. He did not order removal of the original 
evaluation. The principal upgraded the original, back-dated 
it and placed it in the file. 
Burris was evaluated in June 1982. Again, after 
grievance, the Superintendent directed a reevaluation and 
ordered the original evaluation "removed and expunged". 
At an arbitration hearing on March 17. 1983 on another 
matter, the Association sought to show the District's animus 
toward Burris, by introducing the original and upgraded 1980 
evaluations, and the original 1982 evaluation. The District 
objected. During the ensuing discussion. Lewis, an assistant 
to the Superintendent, was overheard to whisper to his 
colleagues, "Let's put it back into the file and let them 
grieve it." 
On March 23. 1983, the unfavorable original 1980 
evaluation was discovered by Burris to be in his personnel 
file. The Association filed a grievance claiming that the 
District improperly placed the original 1980 evaluation in 
Burris' personnel file. At the hearing before the 
Superintendent on this grievance. Lewis asserted that both 
the original 1980 evaluation and the upgraded version should 
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always have been in the file. He also asserted that, because 
of other proceedings relating to Burris, "there was a lot of 
involvement in the files" and no proper logging system 
existed to ascertain who placed the evaluation in the file. 
The Superintendent ordered the original 1980 evaluation 
removed from the file. On April 15. 1983. the Association 
filed the instant charge. 
HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION 
The hearing officer dismissed the charge. He rejected, 
as beyond PERB's jurisdiction, the Association's claim that 
the action with regard to the 1980 evaluation contravened a 
1980 settlement agreement, in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the 
Act. He found that the record does not establish that the 
District interfered with the employee's or organization's 
right to present grievances or discriminated against Burris 
because of his exercise of his grievance rights or because of 
the manner of presentation of his grievance at the 
arbitration hearing. With respect to Lewis' remark, he noted 
that, if made regarding the 1982 evaluation, that evaluation 
was not put in the file, and that, if directed to the 1980 
evaluation, there was an acceptable reason for returning it 
to the file since it had never been formally ordered removed 
or expunged. In effect, he found that the Association had 
not established that the evaluation was placed in the file to 
"punish" or to "retaliate" for conduct at the hearing. 
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Therefore, the placement of the evaluation in the file did 
not violate either §209-a.l(a) or (c) of the Act. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the Association argues that the 
record warrants a holding that the original 1980 evaluation 
was placed in the file in retaliation for the Association's 
presentation at the arbitration hearing and that such 
retaliation constituted interference with the exercise of 
protected rights and discrimination against Burris. The 
Association objects specifically to several of the hearing 
officer's conclusions. To the extent that the exceptions are 
material, they are dealt with in our discussion. 
DISCUSSION 
The sole issue before us is: Does the record support a 
finding that the District interfered with, restrained or 
coerced Burris or the Association or discriminated against 
Burris by placing the original 1980 evaluation in Burris' 
file for the purpose of retaliating against the Association 
and Burris for the manner in which the Association's case was 
presented at an arbitration hearing? 
To conclude that it does, we must make certain key 
findings of fact, for which there is either no direct 
evidence or no unambiguous evidence: 
1. That at no time from the disposition of the 1980 
grievance until after the arbitration hearing was the 
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original 1980 evaluation in the personnel file. - There is 
no direct evidence of this fact. The Association relies on 
ambiguous and unpersuasive collateral evidence relating to 
events at another hearing on March 9. 1983. 
2. That the original 1980 evaluation was placed in the 
file after March 17, 1983. - There is no direct evidence as 
to when it was placed in the file. Needless to say. if it 
was placed in the file before the arbitration hearing, the 
charging party's case would fail. 
3. That Lewis' remark was retaliatory in nature and 
reflected the motive for putting the original 1980 evaluation 
in the file. - This is the main foundation of the 
Association's case. The hearing officer concluded that, even 
if the evaluation was placed in the file after the 
arbitration hearing, the reason for doing so was not 
retaliatory in nature, and that Lewis' remark need not be 
viewed as malicious. We are concerned here solely with the 
motive for the return of the 1980 evaluation to the file. We 
determine that the hearing officer's conclusion, that a 
concern to "complete the material in the file" was a more 
likely motive than any other, is supported by the record. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the record does not 
support a finding that the District acted in violation of 
§209-a.l(a) or (c). We affirm the hearing officer's decision. 
8 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge be. and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 10, 1984 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
3U. JK& OAsLsQ,— 
Ida Klaus , Member 
David 
~<tr ^ > ( m 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU (POLICE DEPARTMENT). 
Respondent, 
-and-
ALLEN UNTERWEISER. 
Charging Party. 
BEE & DeANGELIS. ESQS., for Respondent 
AXELROD, CORNACHIO. FAMIGHETTI & CAPETOLA. ESQS. 
(MICHAEL C. AXELROD. ESQ.. of Counsel), for 
Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Alan 
Unterweiser to a hearing officer's decision dismissing his 
charge. A trustee and delegate of the Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Association of the Police Department of the County of Nassau. 
Inc. (PBA). he complained that the Nassau County Police 
Department (County) transferred him from car patrol to foot 
patrol because of his activities on behalf of PBA. The charge 
was dismissed by the hearing officer on motion of the County 
upon the completion of Unterweiser's case on the ground that 
Unterweiser had not introduced evidence to establish that his 
transfer was improperly motivated. 
#21-2/10/84 
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CHARGING PARTY'S CASE 
Unterweiser. along with twelve other police officers, 
including two other PBA delegates, was first transferred from 
car patrol to foot patrol in January 1983. The transfers were 
occasioned by the disbanding of the Police Department's Crime 
Deterrent Patrol, members of which were reassigned to car 
patrol, displacing Unterweiser and the other twelve officers. 
The decision as to which officers were reassigned was made by 
Precinct Commander Smith and appears to have been based upon 
their productivity on car patrol. In his role as PBA delegate. 
Unterweiser had several "run-ins" with Smith. 
Unterweiser and the two PBA delegates filed grievances 
protesting their reassignment. At Step 1. Smith rejected the 
grievance and it was appealed to the Chief of Patrol in 
accordance with the collective bargaining agreement. However, 
even before the grievance was presented to the Chief of Patrol, 
instructions came from "headquarters" that Unterweiser and the 
two PBA delegates be restored to car patrol and that Smith be 
transferred to another precinct. 
The new Precinct Commander. Jorgensen, told Unterweiser 
and the two PBA delegates that they would have to improve their 
productivity or they would be taken off car patrol 
notwithstanding their union positions, Unterweiser's 
productivity did improve over the next several weeks, but the 
record does not indicate the extent of the improvement. In any 
event, in February 1983 Unterweiser was again transferred to 
I 
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foot patrol; the other two PBA officials were not. This 
transfer was directed by "headquarters" and was not in 
accordance with normal procedures pursuant to which transfers 
are initiated by the Precinct Commander. The record does not 
indicate who in "headquarters" initiated the transfer or 
whether the people who did so knew of Unterweiser's increased 
productivity. There is no evidence that Smith played a role 
in the second transfer. 
DISCUSSION 
Unterweiser makes two arguments in support of his 
exceptions. The first is that, by granting the motion, the 
hearing officer relieved the County of the need to introduce 
its witnesses and thereby improperly deprived him of an 
opportunity to establish his case by cross-examining the 
County's witnesses. This argument is insufficient as a matter 
of law. The duty to make a prima facie case rests with 
charging party alone. 
Unterweiser's second argument is that he did make a prima 
facie case by introducing evidence which, directly or by 
inference, shows that "headquarters" was motivated by animus 
against him for his union activity when it ordered the second 
transfer. He relies on the following aspects of the evidence 
in support of the argument: Unterweiser's PBA position was 
probably known at "headquarters", at least by whoever it was 
who ordered his earlier reassignment to car patrol and the 
) 
Board - U-6721 -4 
similar reassignment of the two other PBA officials, that upon 
his restoration to car patrol, he was told that he would retain 
that assignment if his productivity improved and his 
productivity did improve. Yet, he was then ordered transferred 
by someone at "headquarters" notwithstanding normal procedures 
calling for transfers to be made at the initiation of the 
Precinct Commander. He was given no reason for his transfer. 
In our view, a motion made to a hearing officer to dismiss 
a charge after the presentation of charging party's evidence 
should not be granted without careful deliberation. In 
considering such a motion, a hearing officer must assume the 
truth of all of charging party's evidence and give the charging 
party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that could be 
drawn from those assumed facts. We would reverse a hearing 
officer's decision to grant such a motion unless we could 
conclude that the evidence produced by the charging party, 
including all reasonable inferences therefrom, is plainly 
insufficient even in the absence of any rebuttal by the 
respondent to warrant a finding that the charge should be 
sustained. After careful consideration of the evidence 
produced by the charging party herein, we conclude that it is 
insufficient to warrant a finding that he was singled out by 
"headquarters" for reassignment in February 1983 because of his 
union activity - an essential element of his charge. 
Accordingly, we affirm the hearing officer and dismiss the 
charge. 
Board - U-6721 
-5 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it 
hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: February 10, 1984 
Albany. New York 
C&w—»"> 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
cS^L /£%^^O 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies. Membjex 
> W J M 1 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NASSAU COUNTY BOARD OF COOPERATIVE 
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES. 
Respondent. 
-and-
NASSAU BOCES CENTRAL COUNCIL OF 
TEACHERS. 
Charging Party. 
INGERMAN. SMITH. GREENBERG & GROSS. ESQS. (JOHN H. 
GROSS, ESQ.. of Counsel), for Respondent 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ.. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by Nassau BOCES Central 
Council of Teachers (Council). It alleges that the Nassau 
County Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) 
violated §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law on December 21. 1982. 
and on two occasions thereafter, when it announced that it 
was unwilling to allow the processing of three grievances to 
arbitration. The grievances alleged violations by BOCES of 
the parties' collective bargaining agreement that occurred 
after the expiration of that agreement and after the 
#2G-2/10/84 
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effective date of §209-a.1(e).— 
FACTS 
BOCES and the Council had been parties to an agreement 
which expired on June 30, 1982. The agreement identified two 
typesof grievances as "A" and "B". A type "A" grievance' 
for which the agreement provided binding arbitration, was 
defined as: 
any claim, grievance or dispute arising out 
of or relating to the meaning, interpretation 
or application of the agreement. (emphasis 
supplied) 
A type "B" grievance, for which the agreement provided 
advisory arbitration, was defined as: 
[any] complaint by a grievant that such 
grievant has been treated unfairly or 
inequitably by reason of any act or 
condition, which is contrary to the policies 
of BOCES, or that such grievant has been 
inequitably treated contrary to established 
practices affecting working conditions. 
Section 209-a.l(e) became effective on July 29. 1982. 
It requires public employers "to continue all the terms of an 
expired agreement until a new agreement is negotiated 
. . . ." No new agreement had been negotiated either as of 
December 10 and 20, 1982, which is when the three grievances. 
i^There is no allegation in the charge that the 
conduct of BOCES complained about in the three grievances 
also violates §209-a.l(e). 
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all type "A", were filed, or as of the later dates when 
BOCES stated that it would not allow grievances to be 
processed to arbitration. The hearing officer determined 
that BOCES' refusal to allow the grievances to be processed 
t o a r b i t r a t i on vi ola ted §209-a.1(e). He order ed BOCES to 
"cease and desist from refusing to continue the binding 
arbitration provisions of its expired agreement with 
charging party." 
The Council had filed an unrelated type "A" grievance 
on October 6, 1982. which also complained about conduct of 
BOCES occurring after the effective date of §209-a.l(e). 
When the Council demanded arbitration of that grievance. 
BOCES made a motion before Special Term, Nassau County, 
pursuant to CPLR 7503 for a judgment staying arbitration. 
The court stayed the arbitration of that grievance in an 
order issued after the charge herein was filed, holding: 
When a collective bargaining agreement 
expires in accordance with its terms prior to 
the filing of a grievance thereunder, such 
grievance is not arbitrable since there is no 
agreement in effect . . . . A party cannot 
be compelled to arbitrate a dispute not 
covered by the arbitration agreement . . . ." 
Nassau Co. BOCES v. Nassau BOCES Central 
Council of Teachers, (unreported). 
The court's opinion stated that the enactment of §209-a.l(e) 
does not extend an arbitration provision contained in a 
collective bargaining agreement which expired before the 
statutory amendment became effective. 
Board - U-6636 -4 
We dealt with the implications of the effective date 
of §209-a.l(e), upon the obligation, pursuant to that 
statute, to abide by the terms of an expired collective 
bargaining agreement during the interim between agreements 
in Cobleski 11 Central School District. 16 PERB -<\\3057 
(1983), aff'd Cobleskill Central School District v. Newman, 
16 PERB ir7023 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co., 1983). We stated 
there: 
The statute does not extend the life of the 
expired agreement; it declares that the 
obligation created by that agreement must, 
however, continue to apply during that 
interim. Thus, any obligation of the 
employer that would have become operative at 
a particular time during the life of the 
expired agreement must now apply upon the 
advent of such particular time during the 
hiatus period. For purposes of determining 
whether a violation occurred, the time when 
the agreement expired is therefore not 
significant. What is significant is the 
particular time when the public employer 
refused to continue its terms. 
The hearing officer found merit in the Council's '-
charge. In doing so, he first relied upon our decision in 
Cobleskill for his conclusion that, after §209-a.l(e) took 
effect, BOCES was required to abide by the terms of its 
already expired agreement with the Council, until a new 
agreement was negotiated. As one of the terms of the 
expired agreement was binding arbitration, he determined 
that BOCES had refused to abide by that term. 
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DISCUSSION 
BOCES presents two arguments in support of its 
exceptions. The first, focusing on the Nassau County 
BOCES court case, contends that the decision of the Nassau 
County court holding arbitration to be unavailable is res 
judicata of the issue before us. BOCES claims this to be 
so because the same parties and the same issue are present 
in both proceedings. That issue, it says, is whether 
BOCES is obligated to arbitrate grievances under the terms 
of an expired agreement. 
We find this argument to be without merit. While the 
same parties litigated the question whether they were 
bound to arbitrate disputes under the expired agreement in 
both the court and the instant proceedings, the cases do 
not involve the same cause of action. The cause of action 
in the court case was a contractual one; the issue, which 
arose under CPLR 7503, was whether there was a valid 
agreement to arbitrate. The court decided that there was 
no agreement and that the enactment of §209-a.l(e) did not 
create one. The cause of action in the proceeding before 
us is statutory. The issue here is whether the terms of 
the agreement providing for binding arbitration must be 
continued by virtue of the enactment of §209-a.l(e). The 
issue before us involves a possible improper practice over 
which this Board exercises "exclusive nondelegable 
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jurisdiction . . . . " — A similar distinction between 
statutory and contractual obligations was drawn by the 
Court of Appeals in SLRB v. Holland Laundry. 294 NY 480 
(1940). It held, inter alia, that a lower court decision 
in a civil action which exonerated an employer of- conduct: 
that might constitute an unfair labor practice under the 
State Labor Relations Act did not preclude the Board from 
reaching a contrary conclusion because the Board was 
concerned with the protection of public rights while the 
lower court was concerned with the protection of private 
rights. 
BOCES' second argument is that the hearing officer 
misunderstood its position as being that arbitration, as 
such, is not a term of the old contract which continues. 
On the contrary, it acknowledges that arbitration clauses 
do continue after the expiration of an agreement. It 
further contends that the hearing officer failed to 
consider its real argument, which was that it was not 
required to arbitrate the specific grievance under the 
arbitration clause of the expired agreement. 
2/section 205=5(d) of the Taylor Law. BOCES' 
analysis would not only compel a conclusion that the Court 
decided an issue over which it lacked jurisdiction, but 
also that the Council could not settle a grievance after a 
court determined that it was not arbitrable pursuant to 
agreement for fear that by letting the court decision stand 
unappealed. it could not seek to arbitrate other grievances 
pursuant to statute. 
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In support of this argument, BOCES first notes that the 
arbitrability of a grievance is normally subject to challenge 
in court. It asserts that, in considering such a challenge, 
the court would apply the standards set forth in 
Superintendent of Schools of Liverpool, 42 NY2d 50_9,_ 10 PERB 
ir7535 (1977), as narrowed by Liverpool' s progeny, to ascertain 
whether there is an agreement to arbitrate the particular 
grievance in guestion. BOCES then argues that in determining 
whether a public employer violated the terms of an expired 
agreement by refusing to arbitrate a grievance, we must 
consider the public employer's Liverpool defenses. Finally, 
it argues that the language of the arbitration clause in the 
expired agreement establishes a Liverpool defense which the 
hearing officer ignored. 
We agree with BOCES that this Board should not find a 
public employer in violation of §209-a.l(e) by reason of its 
refusal to arbitrate a grievance when that refusal is based 
upon a valid reason for refusing to allow arbitration. 
Accordingly, we must now consider whether BOCES' reason for 
refusing to allow arbitration of the three grievances is valid. 
The only defense to the charge which BOCES asserts is 
that the arbitration is limited to disputes arising out of the 
parties' agreement. Thus, it says, while §209-a.l(e) may 
continue arbitration in principle, an arbitrator would have no 
jurisdiction over the three grievances because they allege 
violations of the terms of the agreement as extended by 
Board - U-6636 -8 
statute, and not to violations of the agreement itself. 
BOCES finds support for this distinction in our Cobleskill 
decision where we said: 
The statute does not extend the life of the 
expired agreement; it declares that the 
o>bil1qation~ c:reatecl by that agreeroent musr, 
however, continue . . . . 
In effect. BOCES is arguing that, for type "A" grievances, 
it had negotiated an arbitration clause which contains an 
implicit "sunset" provision that renders it inapplicable to 
grievances arising after the expiration of the agreement. 
Pursuant to this reasoning, only a broad arbitration clause 
that applied to all disputes involving terms and conditions of 
employment, such as its type "B" grievance procedure, would 
apply after the expiration of the agreement. 
We reject this argument, finding that it constitutes too 
narrow a reading of §209-a.l(e). the parties' agreement and our 
decision in Cobleskill. The legislative intent reflected in 
the language of §209-a.l(e) is that the contractual 
relationships embodied in a collective bargaining agreement 
shall continue until a new collective bargaining agreement is 
negotiated. In effect, the Legislature has concluded that a 
unilateral disturbance of these relationships by a public 
employer is destructive of the harmony and cooperation that the 
3/ Taylor Law promotes.— 
3/See §200 of the Taylor Law. 
) 
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Here, the contractual relationship that existed under 
the expired collective bargaining agreement included the 
arbitration of contract grievances. Had the parties 
included a "sunset" clause in their agreement which 
explicitlymade the grievance arbitrationinapplicable after 
the contract's expiration, the subsequent refusal of BOCES 
to arbitrate grievances would not be unilateral, and 
therefore not destructive of the statutorily promoted 
harmony and cooperation. The agreement, however, contains 
no such "sunset" clause. Moreover, it defines a type "A" 
grievance as involving not only a claim for the application 
of the agreement, but also for its interpretation. 
Accordingly. BOCES' narrow interpretation of the contract 
language which established type "A" grievances would give it 
a meaning that we find not to have been in the contemplation 
of the parties. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the parties' expired 
agreement established both substantive obligations and an 
arbitral procedure to interpret those obligations. We find 
no basis in the record for concluding that the arbitral 
procedure was intended to expire before the substantive 
obligations. Accordingly, we determine that §209-a.l(e) 
compels BOCES to allow the processing of the three 
grievances to arbitration. 
) 
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NOW. THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the hearing 
officer, and 
WE ORDER BOCES to: 
1. Cease and desist from refusing to 
continue the binding arbitration— 
provision of its expired agreement with 
charging party; 
2. Post a notice in the form attached at 
all locations normally used to post 
notices of information to unit employees 
DATED: February 10. 1984 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
«&-Hfr-t-
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randle^s. Me 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
._PiJBUC_EMPJLQY^ENT_BElAnQNS_5QA^ 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Nassau BOCES 
Central Council of Teachers (Council) that the Nassau County Board of 
Cooperative Educational Services will continue the binding arbitration 
provisions of its contract with the Council that expired on June 30, 1982. 
NASSAU COUNTY BOCES 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF SLOATSBURG, 
Employer. 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE FEDERATION OF POLICE. 
INC. . 
Petitioner, 
-and-
ROCKLAND COUNTY PATROLMENS BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION. 
Intervener. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotia-
ting representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the New York State Federation of 
Police, Inc., has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
#3A-2/10/84 
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exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotia-
tions and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full time police officers 
Excluded; Chief of Police and all other 
employees 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the New York State Federation 
of Police. Inc.. and enter into a written agreement with such 
employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the unit found appropriate, and 
shall negotiate collectively with such employee organization in 
the determination of. and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: February 10. 1984 
Albany, New York 
^i^<^'/<\ /+ &>tfT>*~4—r^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
%£& /d&-«^^ 
Ida Klaus. Member 
9U 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF WHITE PLAINS. 
Employer-Petitioner, 
-----—-au'd-- -
PROFESSIONAL FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION. 
LOCAL 274. IAFF. 
Intervener. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negoti-
ating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Professional Fire Fighters 
Association, Local 274, IAFF, has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above named employer, in the 
unit described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grie-
vances . 
Unit: Included: Deputy Chiefs 
Excluded: All other employees 
- 8834 
#3B-2/10/84 
CASE-NOT C--2545 
Certification - C-2545 page 2 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Professional Fire Fighters 
Association. Local 274. IAFF, and enter into a written agreement 
with such employee organization with regard to terms and condi-
tions of employment of the employees in the unit found appropri-
ate, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee organi-
zation in the determination of. and administration of, grievances 
of such employees. 
DATED: February 10, 1984 
Albany, New York 
^ L * ^ z ^ 
H a r o l d R. Newman. Chairman 
(gyg^c- /ZL&A-**<*3-
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Mat ter of #30-2/10/84 
TOWN OF SOUTHEAST, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2682 
LOCAL 45 6 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS. CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND 
HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotia-
ting representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 456 International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-2682 page 2 
Unit: Included: Equipment Operator; Laborer; 
Mechanic/Equipment Operator; 
Foreman/Mechanic 
Excluded: All other employees of the 
employer 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Local 456 International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters. Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America, and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the unit found appropriate, and shall negotiate 
collectively with such employee organization in the determination 
of. and administration of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: February 10. 1984 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
_ ^ 
David C. Randies. Member 
